Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C.: The Effect of Involuntary Termination on Post-Employment Non-Compete Agreements by Vanisko, Michelle H.
Montana Law Review
Volume 74
Issue 1 Winter 2013 Article 10
January 2013
Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens,
P.C.: The Effect of Involuntary Termination on
Post-Employment Non-Compete Agreements
Michelle H. Vanisko
University of Montana School of Law, michelle.vanisko@umontana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana Law
Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
Michelle H. Vanisko, Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C.: The Effect of Involuntary Termination on Post-Employment
Non-Compete Agreements, 74 Mont. L. Rev. 201 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol74/iss1/10
WRIGG V. JUNKERMIER, CLARK, CAMPANELLA,
STEVENS, P.C.: THE EFFECT OF INVOLUNTARY
TERMINATION ON POST-EMPLOYMENT
NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS
Michelle H. Vanisko*
I. INTRODUCTION
When an employee gets fired, her future employment prospects are
likely among her first concerns.  Regardless of the circumstances of her
departure, her options may be limited by a post-employment, non-competi-
tion agreement.  When such an agreement becomes the subject of litigation,
the court’s primary role is to balance the employer’s need to protect its
legitimate business interests (which may include anything from customer
lists to trade secrets) with the employee’s rights to be mobile and secure
future employment.1  In Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens,
P.C.,2 the Montana Supreme Court addressed for the first time the enforce-
ability of non-compete agreements in the context of an employee’s involun-
tary dismissal from employment.3  The Court concluded that an employer
“assumes the risk of competition” when it ends the employment relation-
ship.4  Accordingly, after Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C.
(“JCCS”) terminated Dawn Wrigg (“Wrigg”), the Court held that JCCS’s
non-compete agreement with Wrigg was unenforceable.5
This note analyzes Wrigg in light of the problems with JCCS’s non-
compete agreement under basic contract rules as well as the psychological
employment contract currently characterizing contemporary employment
relationships.  Section II provides a general background of the Wrigg case.
Section III provides an overview of the legal background relating to non-
compete agreements, focusing on both the most common methods used in
reviewing such agreements and the public policies advanced by the courts
in making these decisions.  Section IV analyzes (1) whether the non-com-
* Michelle Vanisko is a student at The University of Montana School of Law and expects to
receive her Juris Doctor in May 2014.  The author would like to thank her family, especially her hus-
band, Chad, for their constant support.  The author would also like to thank the Montana Law Review
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1. See Kenneth J. Vanko, “You’re Fired! And Don’t Forget Your Non-Compete . . .”: The En-
forceability of Restrictive Covenants in Involuntary Discharge Cases, 1 DePaul Bus. & Comm. L.J. 1
(Fall 2002).
2. Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C., 265 P.3d 646 (Mont. 2011).
3. Id. at 654.
4. Id. at 653.
5. Id. at 654.
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pete agreement in Wrigg is an enforceable contract; (2) how the current
psychological contract, the perception of mutual obligations that exist be-
tween an employee and employer,6 should have impacted the decision; and
(3) whether the manner of departure matters.  Finally, the note concludes
with a recommendation of how the Court should have reviewed the decision
in such a way as to provide guidance for district courts deciding similar
cases in the future.
II. WRIGG V. JUNKERMIER, CLARK, CAMPANELLA, STEVENS, P.C.
A. Factual Background
Dawn Wrigg began working for JCCS in 1987 as a staff accountant.7
She became a shareholder in 2003 and signed a shareholder agreement in
January 2004.8  She signed renewed shareholder agreements in 2005 and
2007.9  The 2007 shareholder agreement expired on June 30, 2009.10  Each
of the shareholder agreements contained a non-compete clause that re-
stricted Wrigg from providing accounting services to anyone to whom
JCCS provided services.  The non-compete clause (“Agreement”) in each of
the shareholder agreements was triggered if Wrigg’s employment was “ter-
minated for any reason.”11
In 2009, after more than 20 years working at JCCS, Wrigg was ad-
vised by letter that her employment would end immediately.12  However,
JCCS agreed to pay Wrigg through the end of her contract term.13  When
she was terminated, Wrigg was earning $154,000 per year.14  Wrigg strug-
gled to find new employment.15  She was eventually hired by an accounting
firm in Great Falls where she earned $87,000 per year.16  After receiving a
demand from JCCS for performance under the Agreement, Wrigg filed a
Petition for Declaratory Judgment to determine whether the Agreement was
enforceable.17
6. Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 149, 165
(Fall 2005).
7. Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 648.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 648.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
2
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B. Trial Court’s Decision
The district court used the factors set forth in Dobbins, De Guire &
Tucker, P.C.  v. Rutherford, MacDonald & Olson18 to determine if the
Agreement was enforceable.  In Dobbins, the Montana Supreme Court
stated that a legal non-compete agreement must meet the following require-
ments: (1) it must be partial or restricted as to time and place; (2) it must be
on some good consideration; and (3) it must be reasonable.19  The district
court concluded the first requirement was met because the Agreement was
limited to one year (time) and restricted to Lewis and Clark County and
contiguous counties (place).20  The second requirement was met because
Wrigg received consideration in the form of continued employment when
each new Agreement was signed.21  The third requirement was met because
the Agreement did not prevent Wrigg from providing services to new cli-
ents regardless of where she was located.22
C. The Parties’ Arguments on Appeal
1. Wrigg’s Argument
On appeal, Wrigg argued that enforcing the Agreement would only
serve to punish her because there was no legitimate business interest to be
protected and the Agreement unreasonably deprived her of her livelihood.23
Wrigg maintained that termination without cause automatically voids non-
compete agreements and suggested this idea was one of first impression for
Montana, thus making it necessary to review how other jurisdictions have
handled the same question.24  Wrigg further argued that both Dobbins and
Mungas v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP,25 heavily relied on by JCCS, were inap-
plicable because in those cases the employees left voluntarily.26  Finally,
Wrigg argued that “a significant central issue” was “whether it [was] rea-
18. Dobbins, DeGuire & Tucker, P.C. v. Rutherford, MacDonald & Olson, 708 P.2d 577 (Mont.
1985).
19. Dobbins, 708 P.2d at 580.
20. Dec. & Or. on Mot. for Declaratory Judm., Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens,
P.C., at Conclusion of Law (hereinafter “COL”) ¶ 3 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Lewis & Clark Co. Apr.
20, 2010) (Cause No. ADV-2009632) (hereinafter “Decision”).
21. Id. at COL ¶ 4.
22. Id. at COL ¶ 5.
23. Appellant’s Opening Br., Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C., 2011 WL
3464851 at **9–10 (Mont. May 23, 2011) (No. DA 11-0147).
24. Id. at *10.
25. Mungas v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 221 P.3d 1230 (Mont. 2009).
26. Appellant’s Opening Br., supra n. 23, at **10–11.
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sonable to enforce a restrictive covenant when the employer terminate[d]
the employment relationship without cause.”27
Wrigg relied heavily on cases from New York and Illinois.  Wrigg
maintained that Montana should follow the reasoning set forth first in Post
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith28 and subsequently in both Rao v.
Rao29 and Bishop v. Lakeland Animal Hospital, P.C.30 that there is no legit-
imate business interest in enforcing a non-compete agreement when the em-
ployer terminates the employment relationship without cause.31  In Post, the
Court held that “where an employee is involuntarily discharged by his em-
ployer without cause and thereafter [competes] with his former employer
. . . [a non-compete agreement] is unreasonable as a matter of law.”32  Sub-
sequently, in dicta, the Rao court said that “the best way for an employer to
protect its goodwill is to . . . retain the services of the employee.”33  Build-
ing on Rao, the Bishop court reasoned that “the implied promise of good
faith inherent in every contract precludes the enforcement of a noncompeti-
tion clause when the employee is dismissed without cause.”34  Wrigg urged
the Court to adopt the reasoning from Post, Rao, and Bishop as its own and
hold the Agreement unenforceable.35
Wrigg also claimed the contract was unenforceable on its face.  Wrigg
argued that there was no consideration for the Agreement.36  Specifically,
Wrigg argued that under Access Organics, Inc.  v. Hernandez,37 she was not
provided any additional compensation at the time she signed the Agreement
because it was not provided to her until after she became a shareholder;
thus, the Agreement lacked consideration.38  In Access Organics, the Court
held that a non-compete agreement, signed after employment began, re-
quires more than continued employment as consideration.39  Like Wrigg,
the plaintiff in Access Organics signed a non-compete agreement more than
four months after he was hired and several weeks after he was given a
promotion.40  The plaintiff was laid off, rehired as a part-time employee a
27. Id. at *10.
28. Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 397 N.E.2d 358 (N.Y. 1979), rehearing denied,
401 N.E.2d 219 (1979).
29. Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219 (7th Cir. 1983).
30. Bishop v. Lakeland Animal Hosp., P.C., 644 N.E.2d 33 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1994).
31. Appellant’s Opening Br., supra n. 23, at **12–20.
32. Post, 397 N.E.2d at 361.
33. Rao, 718 F.2d at 224.
34. Bishop, 644 N.E.2d at 36.
35. Appellant’s Opening Br., supra n. 23, at **12–17.
36. Id. at **20–23.
37. Access Organics, Inc. v. Hernandez, 175 P.3d 899 (Mont. 2008).
38. Appellant’s Opening Br., supra n. 23, at **21–23.
39. Access Organics, 175 P.3d at 903–904.
40. Id. at 901.
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few months later, and then resigned from his part-time position to start his
own competing company.41  The Access Organics Court held that there is
insufficient consideration to support a non-compete agreement when an em-
ployee does not receive any benefit at the time the non-compete agreement
is signed and the employer does not incur any obligation or detriment that
did not already exist.42  Wrigg argued that she did not receive consideration
because she did not sign the original agreement until after she made partner
and that continued employment was not sufficient consideration for the sub-
sequently executed agreements under Access Organics.43
2. JCCS’s Argument
JCCS argued that Wrigg was not terminated because the Agreement
expired by its own terms and that Wrigg received adequate consideration
for the Agreement.44  JCCS relied almost exclusively on Montana law and
argued that it was unnecessary and inappropriate to look outside Montana
for legal authority.45
First, citing several cases, JCCS noted that Montana law did not limit
the enforceability of a non-compete agreement to those employees who
were terminated with cause.46  Accordingly, JCCS maintained that the trial
court’s failure to address the “good cause” question did not constitute legal
error.47  Similarly, relying heavily on Mungas, JCCS argued that the actual
manner of departure was irrelevant and that the terms of the Agreement
control.48  The plaintiffs in Mungas (former physician partners) filed a de-
claratory judgment action against the Great Falls Clinic, LLP requesting
that the non-compete clause of the Clinic’s partnership agreement be de-
clared void as a matter of law.49  The Mungas Court remanded the case to
the trial court, holding that the non-compete agreement was not an absolute
prohibition on the partners’ rights to engage in their chosen profession, and
therefore it may be enforceable.50  Based on this holding, JCCS maintained
that Mungas stood for the proposition that the non-compete agreement is
per se enforceable when a non-compete agreement specifies that the manner
41. Id.
42. Id. at 904.
43. Appellant’s Opening Br., supra n. 23, at **20–22.
44. Appellee’s Opening Br., Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C., 2011 WL
3487384 at *7 (Mont. July 18, 2011) (No. DA 11-0147).
45. Id. at **8–15.
46. Id. at **8–11; see e.g. Mungas, 221 P.3d at 1238; Mont. Mt. Prods. v. Curl, 112 P.3d 979
(Mont. 2005) (where the manner of termination did not merit attention by the Court).
47. Appellee’s Opening Br., supra n. 44, at *12.
48. Id. at **9–10.
49. Mungas, 221 P.3d at 1234.
50. Id. at 1238.
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of departure is irrelevant.51  Of significance, Mungas was remanded to the
district court for a determination of whether the non-compete clause was
reasonable,52 which was the exact question at issue in Wrigg.
JCCS relied on Access Organics to support its argument that Wrigg
received consideration in exchange for signing the Agreement.53  In dicta,54
the Access Organics Court stated that consideration exists if the agreement
is signed at the time of hiring because “the employee and the employer
engage in a bargained-for exchange: the employer obtains the desired non-
compete agreement, and, in return, the employee receives employment.”55
JCCS maintained that Wrigg signed a new Agreement in exchange for a
new guaranteed term of employment at the end of each term of the share-
holder agreement.56  Thus, Access Organics was distinguishable from
Wrigg.  According to JCCS, Wrigg signed the Agreement in exchange for a
specified term of employment, whereas the agreements in Access Organics
were afterthought agreements—agreements signed after the date of hire.57
Under JCCS’s interpretation of Access Organics, Wrigg received considera-
tion for the Agreement in the form of a set term of employment.  Further-
more, JCCS pointed out that Wrigg was paid for the full contract period.58
D. Montana Supreme Court Decision
The Montana Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision by a five-jus-
tice panel, reversed the trial court.  The Court focused on the manner in
which Wrigg’s employment relationship ended.59  The Court clarified that
an employer must first establish a legitimate business interest as a threshold
step to any analysis of the reasonableness of a non-compete agreement.60
For the first time, the Court considered whether an employer could have a
legitimate business interest if it terminated the employer-employee relation-
51. Appellee’s Opening Br., supra n. 44, at **9–10.
52. Mungas, 221 P.3d at 1238.
53. Appellee’s Opening Br., supra n. 44, at **21–22.
54. The question in Access Organics was whether a non-compete agreement signed four months
after employment started was enforceable. Access Organics, 175 P.3d at 903.  Although the discussion
of what constitutes consideration when a non-compete agreement is signed concurrently with the start of
employment is helpful to the general understanding of what forms sufficient consideration under the
Dobbins test, it did not provide the basis for the ultimate holding in Access Organics. Id. at 904.
55. Id. at 903.
56. Appellee’s Opening Br., supra n. 44, at *20.
57. Id. at **21–22.
58. Id. at *24.
59. Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 654.
60. Id. at 650.
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ship.61  Accordingly, the Court reviewed how other jurisdictions have re-
solved the same issue.62
The Court reviewed several cases from several different jurisdictions,
particularly focusing on Rao.63  C.R. Mohan Rao, M.D., S.C. (“Mohan”)
was a medical service corporation based in Chicago, Illinois, and M. Hari
Kishan Rao (“Hari”) was a thoracic and cardiovascular surgeon.64  Hari be-
gan working for Mohan in the spring of 1976.65  In December of 1977, he
signed an employment agreement effective as of the date he was hired.66
The agreement included a non-compete clause prohibiting Hari from prac-
ticing in Holy Cross Hospital upon his departure from employment unless
Hari was a 50% shareholder in Mohan at that time.67  So long as Hari was
not a 50% shareholder, the non-compete clause was triggered when Hari’s
employment ended “for any reason.”68  In 1979, on the eve of Hari’s share-
holder eligibility date, Mohan exercised its right not to renew the contract
under the agreement.69  The notice included an offer to negotiate a new
employment agreement.70  After his departure from Mohan, Hari continued
working at Holy Cross Hospital.71   Mohan filed suit to enforce the agree-
ment.72
In Rao, the court held that the non-compete agreement was unenforce-
able because Mohan did not act in good faith in terminating Hari, and there-
fore Mohan did not have a legitimate business interest.73  The court also
held that the non-compete clause was unreasonably oppressive.74  The Rao
court echoed existing Illinois case law that employees are allowed to take
the skills and knowledge gained during employment with them.75  While
the Rao court said that a company’s goodwill is a legitimate business inter-
est, it also stated that “the best way for an employer to protect its goodwill
is to continue to retain the services of the employee.”76  Hari was dismissed
only ten days prior to the maturation of his option to purchase shares in the
61. Id. at 652.
62. Id. at 652–654.
63. Id. at 653–654.
64. Rao, 718 F.2d at 221.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Rao, 718 F.2d at 221.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 222–223.
74. Id. at 223.
75. Id. at 223–224.
76. Rao, 718 F.2d at 224.
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company.77  The court found that under these circumstances a restrictive
covenant “is not reasonably necessary to protect an employer’s goodwill.”78
Moreover, the court reasoned that in such cases the only purpose for impos-
ing a restrictive covenant is to prevent competition—“an insufficient justifi-
cation for enforceability.”79
The Wrigg Court concluded that when an employer terminates the em-
ployer-employee relationship without cause, it “lacks a legitimate business
interest in a covenant” and therefore the Agreement should not be en-
forced.80  In dicta, however, the Court asserted that there may be circum-
stances in which an employer can terminate an employee for cause and
retain the right to enforce the non-compete agreement.81  The Court made
no determination regarding what those circumstances may be, maintaining
that “[t]he employer . . . would have to establish the legitimacy of the busi-
ness interest and the nature of the risk posed by the former employee’s
competition.”82
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Generally, non-compete agreements are contracts between employers
and employees that prevent post-employment competition by a former em-
ployee.  Non-compete agreements are intended to protect the employer
from an employee’s unauthorized use of protected information gained while
employed by the former employer or prevent an employee from soliciting
business clients for the employee’s personal gain at a new position.83  Be-
cause of the significant restraints they impose on an employee, such agree-
ments are generally disfavored throughout the United States.84  Nonethe-
less, they are common and often found to be enforceable.85
The enforceability of a non-compete agreement depends on many fac-
tors.  To be enforceable, an agreement needs to be based on good considera-
tion, be reasonable as to time and place, and should not be against public
policy.86  Public policy concerns include, among others, that the covenant is
not intended to prevent ordinary competition but is meant to protect a legiti-
77. Id. at 221.
78. Id. at 224.
79. Id.
80. Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 653.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete Agree-
ments: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 Am. Bus. L.J. 107, 116 (Spring 2008).
84. Vanko, supra n. 1, at 1; Garrison & Wendt, supra n. 83, at 164–165.
85. Vanko, supra n. 1, at 12–13; Garrison & Wendt, supra n. 83, at 121–123.
86. See e.g. A.E.P. Indus., Inc. v. McClure, 302 S.E.2d 754, 760–761 (N.C. 1983).
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mate business interest.87  In addition to the basic requirements of a non-
compete agreement, whether the employment relationship ends at the be-
hest of the employer or employee, and under what specific circumstances
the relationship ends, may also impact the enforceability of a non-compete
agreement.88
There are varying methods to adjudicate non-compete agreements.
Historically, courts have used three distinct but wide-ranging approaches
for determining the validity of non-compete agreements when an employee
is involuntarily terminated.89  In some jurisdictions, including New York,
non-compete agreements are per se invalid when an employee is involunta-
rily terminated.90  In others, including Florida, the nature of termination is
not considered at all.91  But, the majority of courts fall in the middle of the
spectrum and have found that the validity of non-compete agreements turns
on the nature of the employer’s conduct in effectuating the termination.92
Thus, in these jurisdictions, non-compete agreements are invalid when: (1)
the employee is involuntarily terminated; (2) the employer shows bad faith
in the termination; or (3) equitable considerations militate against enforce-
ment.93
Regardless of which approach is used, the competing interests of the
employer and the employee are considered to some extent.  Each jurisdic-
tion is different, and there are numerous factors used to assess the validity
of covenants not to compete.  However, two factors frequently considered
by the courts are the employee’s interest in working in her chosen profes-
sion and the employer’s legitimate business interest in preventing her from
competing.94  Moreover, courts favor non-compete agreements that are lim-
ited in duration, geographical area, and the scope of activity restricted.  As
previously stated, the general rule is that a covenant not to compete should
be no more restrictive than necessary to protect the employer’s interests.95
Thus, because the employee has a right to continue in her chosen profes-
87. See e.g. Frieburger v. J-U-B Engs., Inc., 111 P.3d 100, 104–105 (Idaho 2005).
88. See e.g. Rao, 718 F.2d 219.
89. Vanko, supra n. 1, at 9.
90. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Carmosino, 77 A.D.3d 1434, 1436 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); Post, 397
N.E.2d at 361; Vanko, supra n. 1, at 10.
91. See e.g. Henao v. Prof. Shoe Repair, Inc., 929 So. 2d 723, 726–727 (Fla. 5th Dist. App. 2006);
Twenty Four Collection, Inc. v. Keller, 389 So. 2d 1062, 1063–1064 (Fla. 3d Dist. App. 1980); Vanko,
supra n. 1, at 9.
92. Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 733 (Pa. 1995); Pulse Tech., Inc. v. Dodrill,
2007 WL 789434 at **8–9 (D. Or. Mar. 14, 2007); PharMethod, Inc. v. Caserta, 382 Fed. Appx. 214,
221 (3d Cir. 2010); Rao, 718 F.2d at 224; Vanko, supra n. 1, at 9.
93. Vanko, supra n. 1, at 11.
94. Dobbins, 708 P.2d at 580.
95. Mont. Mt. Prods, 112 P.3d at 981; Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 371
(Mont. 1990); Rao, 715 F.2d at 224; Shapiro v. Regent Printing Co., 549 N.E.2d 793, 799 (Ill. 1999)
(Jiganti, J., dissenting).
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sion, a non-compete agreement is not enforced unless a business’s protect-
able interests are at risk.96  Courts usually97 recognize an employer’s legiti-
mate interest in protecting its trade secrets and goodwill.98  But many courts
have held that the skills, experience, and knowledge gained during employ-
ment are the employee’s assets and are not protectable business interests of
the former employer.99
Montana, like many other states, balances the equities of the employer
and employee.  In Montana, non-compete agreements are generally disfa-
vored.100  Montana Code Annotated § 28–2–703, which provides that any
contract in restraint of trade is generally void, is an embodiment of Mon-
tana’s common law.101  Specifically, the statute declares that “[a]ny con-
tract by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession,
trade, or business of any kind, otherwise than is provided for by
§ 28–2–704 [excepting the sale of goodwill of a business] or § 28–2–705
[excepting dissolution of partnerships], is to that extent void.”102  The Mon-
tana Supreme Court has found that § 28–2–703 applies to all forms of re-
strictive covenants, whether or not they are directly related to employ-
ment.103  Although § 28–2–703 would seem to prohibit the type of cove-
nant at issue in Wrigg on its face, that is not the case.  The statute only
prohibits a total restraint of trade (i.e., the inability to practice one’s chosen
profession in any capacity), not a partial restraint.  Where a restraint is only
partial, it may be allowed depending on the reasonableness of the re-
straint.104  Thus, when a non-compete agreement is not a total restraint on
96. John Dwight Ingram, Covenants Not to Compete, 36 Akron L. Rev. 49, 51 (2002).
97. Except for a few very narrow exceptions, California does not recognize employee non-compete
agreements at all.  Cal. Bus. & Professions Code Ann., §§ 16600–16602 (West  2012) (first enacted in
1872).  California common law provides questionable applicability of the “trade secret exception” to
non-compete clauses under contract law theory; however, such violations are a clearly identified cause
of action under California tort law.  Thus, trade secrets are generally protected under the Uniform Trade
Secret Act. See e.g. Ret. Group v. Galante, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 592–593 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2009)
(distinguishing lists that are the product of directed effort, are not readily available/identifiable by other
means, and are used by former employees to directly solicit a former employer’s customers from mere
identities and locations of customers where anyone could easily identify the entities as potential custom-
ers as worthy of trade secret protection); Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d (Cal. App.
2d Dist. 2009).
98. Garrison & Wendt, supra n. 83, at 116.
99. Pathfinder Commun. Corp. v. Macy, 795 N.E.2d 1103, 1110 (Ind. App. 2003); Donahue v.
Permacel Tape Corp., 127 N.E.2d 235, 240 (Ind. 1955); Ingram, supra n. 96, at 51.
100. Mont. Code Ann. § 28–2–703 (2011); Access Organics, 175 P.3d at 902; Dumont v. Tucker,
822 P.2d 96, 98 (Mont. 1991).
101. See Schwanekamp v. Modern Woodmen of Am., 120 P. 806, 807 (Mont. 1912).
102. Mont. Code Ann. § 28–2–703.
103. See St. Med. Oxygen & Supply v. Am. Med. Oxygen Co., 782 P.2d 1272, 1274–1275 (Mont.
1989) (involving a prohibition on disclosure of customer lists and trade secrets); Haggerty v. Gallatin
Co., 717 P.2d 550, 556–557 (Mont. 1986) (involving a commercial use restriction in the context of a
negative easement).
104. Mont. Mt. Prods., 112 P.3d at 982.
10
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trade, the courts look to factors such as limitations on time and geographic
scope to determine whether the restrictions violate § 28–2–703.105
IV. ANALYSIS
When a Montana court determines the validity of a non-compete
agreement, it follows a two-step process.  First, it looks to see if the agree-
ment is a full restraint on trade and then, when appropriate, looks to see if
the agreement meets the necessary elements to be considered reasonable.106
A full restraint on trade is per se unreasonable.107  A partial restraint on
trade is reasonable when: (1) it is limited in time or place; (2) it is based on
good consideration; and (3) it affords “reasonable protection for and does
not impose an unreasonable burden upon the employer, the employee or the
public.”108
The Wrigg Court did not adhere to the two-step process it announced.
Prior to Wrigg, Montana had not addressed the validity of non-compete
agreements when an employee was involuntarily terminated from her em-
ployment.109  This question was narrowly addressed in Wrigg.  The Court
specifically addressed only whether JCCS had a legitimate business interest
in enforcing the Agreement when it terminated Wrigg’s employment with-
out cause.110  Although JCCS argued that the manner in which the relation-
ship ended was irrelevant to determining the enforceability of the Agree-
ment, the Court focused exclusively on this issue.111
While this author agrees with the Court’s ultimate decision, she argues
that the Court’s discussion of the issues was incomplete.  The Court first
should have evaluated whether the Agreement was generally an enforceable
contract.  In so doing, the Court could have provided additional guidance
for future cases.  Furthermore, the psychological contract, discussed below,
is critical in today’s employer-employee relationship because of the em-
ployee’s perceived promises from the employer.  Thus, in discussing
whether an employer choosing to end an employment relationship can en-
force a non-compete clause, the Court’s analysis would have benefitted
from a discussion of the psychological contract.  Finally, the Court should
have established a rebuttable presumption of invalidity of non-compete
agreements when the employee is involuntarily terminated.
105. St. Med. Oxygen & Supply, 782 P.2d at 1275.
106. Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 649.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 654.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 653–654.
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A. The Agreement
Any assessment of a non-compete agreement should address the valid-
ity of the underlying contract.  This is especially true in Montana where
non-probationary employees may only be terminated for good cause.112
Because Montana’s statutory scheme prohibits at-will employment, the only
way an employer can legally let someone go without cause is if the employ-
ment contract provides for it.  Such an agreement allows an employer to
contractually circumvent many of the protections Montana’s statutory
scheme provides to employees.  Accordingly, it makes sense that courts
should first address whether the underlying contract is even valid.  If the
contract is invalid, determining whether a non-compete clause is enforcea-
ble would be superfluous.  Yet, the Wrigg Court failed to address any of the
contract questions argued by the parties and found that the involuntary ter-
mination issue was dispositive.113  Addressing the contract issues would
have provided district courts with guidance on how to resolve similar mat-
ters in the future and, by providing more meaningful precedent, could have
potentially prevented legal disputes entirely.114  In particular, the Court
should have addressed whether there was any consideration for the Agree-
ment and whether the contractual provisions were enforceable on their face.
1. Consideration
Consideration is only one of the basic elements of contracts.  In Mon-
tana, there are four basic elements—capacity to contract, offer, acceptance,
and consideration—and all four elements must exist for a contract to be
enforceable.115  As such, courts require adequate consideration to support a
covenant not to compete.116  Because of the potential impact on employees,
if the non-compete agreement is signed after the employee starts her job,
the agreement must be supported by new or additional consideration.117
Yet the Court in Wrigg failed to address whether JCCS provided any
consideration in exchange for Wrigg signing the Agreement.  Wrigg argued
that she did not receive any consideration for the non-compete clause be-
cause she did not receive the Agreement until several months after she ac-
112. Mont. Code Ann. § 39–2–904; see generally Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39–2–901 et seq. (Wrongful
Discharge from Employment Act).
113. Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 648.
114. This case presented a unique opportunity for the Court to elucidate Montana law regarding what
is (or is not) a legitimate business interest as required under Dobbins.  Thus, it is possible that the Court
intentionally left the remaining contract issues alone so that the rule of law set forth in Wrigg is not
diluted by the discussion of other issues.
115. Mont. Code Ann. § 29–2–102.
116. Ingram, supra n. 96, at 54.
117. Access Organics, 175 P.3d at 903.
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cepted the position as shareholder.118  In response, JCCS argued that Wrigg
was guaranteed employment for a set term and that this guarantee was suffi-
cient to meet the consideration requirement necessary for the Agreement to
be enforceable.119  Good consideration is a bargained-for benefit received
by the promisor that she was not already entitled to at the time the agree-
ment was made.120  Therefore, continued employment by itself cannot be
sufficient consideration.121  JCCS, relying on Access Organics, contended
that Wrigg was guaranteed a specified term of employment to which she
was not entitled at the time of contracting.122  The Court should have evalu-
ated the consideration question, thus clarifying the Access Organics deci-
sion.
While a holding that Wrigg did (or did not) have adequate considera-
tion would not have altered the Wrigg decision,123 any such holding likely
would have helped district courts resolve this same question for later liti-
gants.  Both Wrigg and JCCS used Access Organics in support of their re-
spective arguments concerning consideration, and they both accurately re-
stated the holding of that case.  Past consideration will not suffice to make a
non-compete agreement enforceable,124 but a guaranteed span of employ-
ment might rise to the level of adequate consideration.125  In Montana,
“clear evidence [is needed to show] that the employee received good con-
sideration in exchange for [executing a non-compete agreement].”126 This
is the question that further analysis on this issue would have resolved.  Or,
if not actually resolving the issue, further analysis of this question could
have provided district courts with the necessary guidance to resolve future
disputes.127
If the Court had reviewed whether there was consideration, it could
have determined that there was insufficient consideration to uphold the
Agreement.  Independent consideration exists when a non-compete agree-
ment is signed ancillary to new employment,128 when an employee is given
118. Appellant’s Opening Br., supra n. 23, at **20–23.
119. Appellee’s Opening Br., supra n. 44, at **21–22.
120. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981); Mont. Code Ann. § 28–2–801.
121. Access Organics, 175 P.3d at 903.
122. Appellee’s Opening Br., supra n. 44, at **13, 21.
123. It is clear that the Wrigg Court assumed the Agreement was a legal contract, albeit unenforce-
able on other grounds.  A finding that consideration existed would not have altered the outcome of this
case.
124. Access Organics, 175 P.3d at 903.
125. Id. at 904.
126. Id.
127. It is possible that the Court intentionally analyzed the limited question of whether the Agree-
ment was enforceable when Wrigg was involuntarily terminated to provide a succinct answer to that
question.  If that was the case, this author believes that such an approach was shortsighted because the
Court will likely see this question again in the near future.
128. Access Organics, 175 P.3d at 903.
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a raise or promotion,129 or when an employee is given access to confidential
information.130  Even when independent consideration is provided, the
agreement is enforceable only if it is signed by the employee at the time the
consideration is actually received.131  In Wrigg, the original non-compete
was signed two months after Wrigg became partner.  Thus, as to the first
agreement, there likely was no consideration.  The second and third agree-
ments provided no raise or promotion.  At most, Wrigg was provided “guar-
anteed” employment.  Yet in Montana, where employees are not subject to
at-will employment, a term contract does not provide guaranteed employ-
ment.  On the contrary, by signing the shareholder agreement, Wrigg went
from having job security (to the extent that good cause was required to
terminate her) to having no job security (to the extent that JCCS was not
required to renew the contract at any time).  Thus, as to the second and third
agreements, there likely was no consideration.
2. Contract Provisions
In Montana, term employment agreements may be a means by which
employers can legally get around Montana’s prohibition against at-will em-
ployment.  Upon expiration of the term, an employer may terminate a long-
(or short-) time employee for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at
all.  In other words, upon expiration of the term, a Montana employer no
longer has to have good cause to terminate the employee.  As such, term
contracts should be viewed with suspicion and in favor of the employee.
This is especially true when the employment agreement includes a non-
compete clause that will limit an ex-employee’s ability to practice her trade
elsewhere.
The state of Virginia determined that non-compete agreements are un-
enforceable in conjunction with term employment contracts.  For example,
in Clinch Valley Physicians, Inc.  v. Garcia,132 the Court held that the non-
compete clause in a term employment contract was unenforceable as a mat-
ter of law.133  Luis Garcia (“Garcia”) was a shareholder-employee of Clinch
Valley Physicians, Inc.  (“CVP”) who, subsequent to his original hire,
agreed to a proposed amendment to his employment agreement with
CVP.134  The amended contract was a one-year term contract135 that in-
cluded provisions for termination and a non-compete clause (nearly identi-
129. Id.
130. Daniels, 804 P.2d at 371.
131. Access Organics, 175 P.3d at 903–904.
132. Clinch Valley Phys., Inc. v. Garcia, 414 S.E.2d 599 (Va. 1992).
133. Id. at 601.
134. Id.at 600.
135. Id.
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cal to that signed by Wrigg) that was triggered when Garcia left “for any
reason.”136  Upon expiration of the contract in 1990, Garcia filed suit for
declaratory judgment to determine whether the non-compete provision of
the employment agreement was enforceable.137  Garcia argued that the non-
compete agreement was not enforceable because he did not voluntarily
leave—his employer had provided notice of its intent not to renew the con-
tract, and the contract expired.138
Although the result was the same for the employees in Clinch Valley
Physicians and Wrigg, the respective Courts’ reasoning differed.  The
Clinch Valley Physicians Court determined whether the non-compete clause
was enforceable based on a strict interpretation of the terms of the employ-
ment agreement;139 Wrigg, rather, hinged on whether JCCS had a legitimate
protectable business interest when it initiated termination of the employ-
ment relationship.140  In Wrigg, the Court recognized but then declined to
address JCCS’s question of whether terminating the Agreement is the same
as allowing it to expire141—both terms being fundamental to the Agree-
ment.  JCCS maintained that a discussion of reasonableness concerning “in-
voluntarily terminated” employees was immaterial because Wrigg was not
terminated; her contract expired.142  The non-compete clause underlying
Wrigg contains the following provisions:
7. POST-EMPLOYMENT REPRESENTATION OF CLIENTS. If this
Agreement is TERMINATED for any reason . . . .
. . .
12. TERMINATION. [Wrigg] shall be TERMINATED automatically and im-
mediately upon the happening of any of the following events:
. . .
d. For any reason as determined by a 75% vote of the Board of Directors of
JCCS.143
Termination is not defined outside this context anywhere in the shareholder
agreement, although the agreement expired on June 30, 2009.144  The expi-
ration date is relevant because, under JCCS’s argument, Wrigg was not ter-
minated but rather her contract expired.  And even though Wrigg was asked
to leave before the end of her term, she was paid through the expiration date
of the shareholder agreement.145  Under the terms of the shareholder agree-
136. Id. at 601.
137. Id. at 600–601.
138. Clinch Valley Phys., 414 S.E.2d at 600–601.
139. Id. at 601.
140. Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 654.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Appellant’s Opening Br., supra n. 23, at Ex. 2.
144. Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 648.
145. Id. at 654.
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ment, is expiration the equivalent of termination?  If the expressions are not
the same, does the Agreement come into play if the contract is in all re-
spects complied with but not renewed by the parties?  These questions con-
cerning the actual terms of the shareholder agreement are questions the
Court should have addressed.
B. The Psychological Contract
Employment relationships have always existed between employees
and employers with underlying mutual expectations on the part of each.
These expectations, or obligations, emerge when the employee perceives
that her contributions as an employee create a reciprocal obligation by her
employer.146  These mutual obligations become the psychological contract.
A psychological contract can emerge from actual promises made, company
recruitment material, employee personnel or policy handbooks, and even
through the general knowledge of coworkers passed through idle chit-chat
at work.147   Beginning in the 1980s, the focus of employment relationships
began to change.148  They are no longer characterized by steady, long-term
employment.149  Instead, today’s relationships are characterized by advanc-
ing in the job market through employer-shuffling—taking to each new em-
ployer the knowledge acquired in past employment.150  Because of this
shift, a new, implied contract has developed.  Instead of committing to
long-term employer-employee relationships, employers are impliedly offer-
ing marketability to their employees.151  This change of focus has affected
the perceived value of employees to their employers152 and hence should
also affect how courts analyze legitimate business interests in the post-ter-
mination limits of mobility and employability imposed by non-compete
agreements.153
146. Bird, supra n. 6, at 165.
147. Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Work-
place for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 519, 539 (Feb. 2001).
148. Garrison & Wendt, supra n. 83, at 165.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 166–167.
151. Id.
152. Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the Ownership of Human Capital in
the Changing Workplace, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 721, 737 (Spring 2002).
153. In order to adequately address legitimate business interests, application of the psychological
theory needs to be limited.  Like any other social contract theory, the psychological contract theory is
not boundless.  That is to say, it would be impossible for the psychological contract theory to address
every employment scenario.  What happens when the employer and employee’s expectations are diamet-
rically in conflict with each other?  How is an employer supposed to know exactly what obligations are
expected of him?  How does an employer know when the “perceived” obligations even start?  These
types of questions can be adequately addressed only if any alleged breach in the psychological contract
is based in the reasonable expectations of the employee.
16
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The psychological contract is analogous to an implied contract.  Thus,
using the psychological contract in analyzing the reasonableness of a non-
compete agreement is rational.  Similar to the psychological contract, an
employee’s understanding of an implied contract is derived from her expe-
rience at the work place.  For example, when an employee is provided with
the company’s personnel policy, her expectations concerning her rights and
obligations change, presumably enhancing the employment relationship154
or at least clarifying it.  When an employer chooses to establish particular
policies and applies them equally to all the employees, the employer estab-
lishes a continuing obligation to his employees.155  At least as applied to
personnel policies, there does not need to be a mutual understanding be-
tween employer and employee, nor does the employee need to know the
specifics of the company’s policies to create an enforceable implied con-
tract.156  Under these circumstances, “[t]he employer secures an orderly,
cooperative and loyal work force, and the employee the peace of mind asso-
ciated with job security and the conviction that he will be treated fairly.”157
Even though this example of an implied contract is phrased in terms of the
older psychological contract model, the concept of unspoken mutual obliga-
tions that are the basis of implied contracts is the crux of the psychological
concept theory.
The current psychological contract concept tends to impact the em-
ployee more than the employer.  Psychological contracts are only the em-
ployee’s beliefs about her employer’s obligations and are not enforceable
contracts per se.158  Based on past action or outright promises, an employee
has specific expectations about what the employer “owes” her by way of
position, wages, or long-term job security.159  For example, if an employee
has worked for a company for several years and has watched coworkers
promoted at regular intervals, that employee would likely expect to be pro-
moted at similar intervals in her own career.  All other things being equal,
if, instead, the employee becomes stagnant in the company or, even worse,
is demoted or receives a pay cut, the employee may find the employer
breached the psychological employment contract.  Although these
“breaches” may not be legally actionable claims, they could impact the em-
ployee’s attitude and performance, potentially leading to either the em-
ployee or employer terminating the relationship.160
154. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Bird, supra n. 6, at 165.
159. Id. at 167.
160. Id. at 165–166.
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In the employment context, it is reasonable that the perception of mu-
tual obligations that exist between an employee and employer evolve as
economic and social conditions change.  Prior to the “computer age,”161 the
standard employment arrangement had the employer promising the em-
ployee an opportunity for continued employment and advancement in ex-
change for employee loyalty.162  As a result, businesses were able to engage
in long-term planning and invest in their employees,163 while the employees
were not burdened with uncertainty.  As the American workforce in white-
collar industries increased, a new employment relationship evolved that de-
emphasized stability and emphasized mobility for employees.164  Instead of
promising long-term employment, employers now provide the tools for
continued employability, which makes employees more marketable in their
chosen fields.165  As a result, non-compete agreements have become more
provocative and contentious in an era when employees are becoming more
mobile and more dependent on access to external job markets while em-
ployers offer less long-term employment and become “more aggressive in
their use of non-compete agreements.”166  As the use of non-compete agree-
ments increases because our economic and social conditions change, it be-
comes more important to understand the changing perception of the mutual
obligations between employers and employees.
The psychological contract demands that employers and employees in-
teract with each other in good faith.  It is a basic premise of a non-compete
agreement that a departing employee is restricted from practicing her trade
under certain conditions.  Thus, when a non-compete agreement is en-
forced, the employer’s ability to act in good faith and fulfill its implicit
promise to ensure the employee is competitive and employable in his cho-
sen field is more difficult.  The facts in Rao, discussed above, are illustra-
tive of this point.  When Mohan terminated Hari, he acted in bad faith.167  If
Mohan were successful in his bid to enforce the restrictive covenant, Hari
would have been unable to practice his chosen profession in the Chicago
area—decreasing his marketability in direct contrast to the implied
promises made to him under the psychological contract.  Hari clearly ex-
pected that he could take the skills and knowledge he gained while working
161. The computer age is characterized by the idea that current industry is embodied with the ability
of individuals to freely transfer information while simultaneously having instant access to information
that previously would have been difficult to find.
162. Garrison & Wendt, supra n. 83, at 165.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 166.
165. Id. at 166–167.
166. Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete
Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 415 (Dec. 2006).
167. Rao, 718 F.2d at 223.
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for Mohan with him to the hospital at which he practiced.168  Moreover,
under Illinois law, Hari was entitled to take those skills upon his departure
from Mohan.169  The Rao court’s decision was largely based on Mohan’s
bad faith action in terminating Hari.  If Mohan had instead waited for Hari
to try and expand his practice to other local hospitals before trying to en-
force the restrictive covenant, it may have succeeded in its attempt to en-
force the non-compete agreement while simultaneously fulfilling any obli-
gation under the psychological contract.
C. Involuntary Termination170
In our current economic environment, an involuntarily terminated em-
ployee finds herself in dire employment circumstances that can only be ex-
acerbated by a potentially enforceable non-compete agreement.  She is un-
expectedly without an income and, unless she was already looking, the pos-
sibility of finding a job in her chosen field is unknown.  In such a situation,
the added restraint of a non-compete agreement appears to lose its value as
a business tool and instead becomes a method of punishment.171  Unfortu-
nately, the Court’s holding in Wrigg is not completely clear on the value of
non-compete agreements when the employee is involuntarily terminated.
The Court recognized that “circumstances may exist in which the employer
chooses to end the employment relationship . . . [for cause] . . . [providing]
the employer with a legitimate business reason to seek to enforce the cove-
nant.”172  Yet the Court held that “JCCS elected to terminate its employ-
ment relationship with Wrigg, and, accordingly, [could not] enforce its cov-
enant under these circumstances.”173  The ambiguity in the phrase “under
these circumstances” may give rise to multiple interpretations, including
both the implication that when an employee is fired for cause there could be
a legitimate business interest to protect174 as well as the inference that
whenever an employer terminates the employment relationship there is no
168. Id. at 221.
169. Id. at 223 (citing MBL (USA) Corp. v. Diekman, 445 N.E.2d 418, 424 (Ill. App. 1st Dist.
1983)).
170. “Involuntary termination” includes employees who are fired, laid off, under contracts that
expire, etc.  Because there was a dispute about whether Wrigg was terminated or whether her contract
merely expired, the inclusive meaning of the phrase is more relevant.
171. See Post, 397 N.E.2d at 360–361.
172. Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 653.
173. Id. at 654.
174. For example, an employee fired for stealing confidential company information or embezzling
company funds has imbued such a level of distrust that it is hard to imagine an employer not firing her.
Under such circumstances, provided the non-compete terms are otherwise reasonable under state law,
there likely is no reason the agreement would not be enforced.  While this is only one example, it aptly
demonstrates that there could be valid reasons to enforce non-compete agreements when an employee is
terminated for cause.
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legitimate business interest to protect.  The Court essentially provided for
both a presumption against enforcement as well as a per se rule of invalid-
ity.
As non-compete agreements become more commonplace in the work
force, more and more courts are looking to the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding termination to see if they are enforceable.175  Thus, it is important
to note the two approaches in other jurisdictions.  Several states provide
guidance for why non-compete agreements should not be enforced when an
employee is involuntarily terminated, with or without cause.  For example,
California is frequently cited by opponents of non-compete agreements as
an example of how such agreements hinder job growth and advancement.176
These same commentators credit the quick growth of the Silicon Valley to
California’s public policy promoting the free mobility of its labor market,
claiming that those workers were not hampered by the constraints of a non-
compete agreement.177  In fact, California courts have found the public pol-
icy against non-compete agreements so compelling that an otherwise at-will
employee can bring a wrongful discharge claim against an employer who
terminates employment when the employee refuses to sign a non-compete
agreement.178  As the California courts have observed, the law against non-
compete agreements protects its residents and confirms that all citizens
shall retain the legal right to engage in businesses and occupations of their
choosing.179  California’s jurisprudence has shown that its underlying rea-
soning against non-compete agreements in employment contracts is a fun-
damental policy of the state.180  Such a policy is most important when an
employee is involuntarily terminated, whether the termination is with or
without cause.
Similarly, New York’s employee-friendly policy concerning non-com-
petes may explain its status as one of the world’s leading economic cities.
175. Brobston, 667 A.2d at 733; Pulse Tech., Inc. v. Dodrill, 2007 WL 789434 at **9–10 (D. Or.
Mar. 14, 2007); PharMethod, Inc. v. Caserta, 382 Fed. Appx. 214, 221 (3d Cir. 2010); Rao, 718 F.2d at
224–225; Vanko, supra n. 1, at 9.
176. Ingram, supra n. 96, at 79.
177. Id.
178. See Silguero v. Creteguard, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2011); Cal. Bus. &
Professions Code Ann. § 16600.
179. Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573 (Cal. App. 2d Dist.
1994).
180. Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 290 (Cal. 2008) (affirming the long-standing
legislative policy that its citizens had the right to pursue the career of their choice); Application Group,
Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 85–86 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1998) (applying California
law to an out-of-state employment contract to advance California’s fundamental policy of protecting an
employee’s right to pursue the occupation of their choice); but see Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Mudron, 887
N.E.2d 437, 440 (Ill. App. 3d Dist. 2008) (applying Illinois law to out-of-state employment contract to
advance Illinois’ public policy of providing its workers greater protection from the negative effects of
restrictive covenants than Florida law would provide).
20
Montana Law Review, Vol. 74 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol74/iss1/10
2013 TERMINATION AND NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS 221
Its rapidly-growing market181 had to be served by those who could adjust to
the expanding needs more easily.  New York has “powerful considerations
of public policy which militate against sanctioning the loss of a man’s live-
lihood.”182  New York does not have a near-absolute ban on non-complete
agreements like California, but it goes beyond protecting employees who
are involuntarily terminated without cause.  And like California, New
York’s policy of protecting its employees might explain why its workforce
has been able to meet the employment needs of its historic expanding econ-
omy.  The New York courts have developed a per se rule against enforcing
non-compete agreements when an employee has been involuntarily termi-
nated without cause183 as Montana seemed to in Wrigg.  However, New
York took it one step further and provided protection for employees under
personal service contracts, stating that such contracts will only be enforced,
regardless of the termination circumstances, if an employer can show that
the services provided by the departing employee are unique, special, or ex-
traordinary to the specific departing employee.184  When an employer ter-
minates the employee, “[the employer] should not be permitted to use of-
fensively [a non-competition] clause . . . to economically cripple a former
employee and simultaneously deny other potential employers [her] ser-
vices.”185  This is true even when the termination would fall within the
guidelines of a legitimate business interest due to the company closing its
facility.186
Although California and New York laws concerning non-compete
agreements are very protective of employees’ rights, they are a minority.
Most of the states stay in the middle of the continuum while protecting their
respective labor markets.187  These middle ground jurisdictions have held
that non-compete clauses are: (1) presumptively invalid when the employee
is involuntarily discharged;188 (2) invalid when there is an element of bad
faith involved in the termination;189 or (3) invalid if the equities weigh in
181. Greg Clark, London and New York in the 21st Century.  New Competition and New Opportuni-
ties: Can London and New York Still Be the Leading World Cities in 2100? The London New York
Dialogue Background Report 7–8 (July 2008) (providing a historical summary of New York’s economic
growth from 1900 to 2000) (available at http://www.london-ny.com/reports).
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favor of the employee.190  Invalidating non-compete agreements in these
jurisdictions tends to focus on the manner of discharge.  Moreover, this au-
thor suggests that in these jurisdictions, when courts balance the equities
they should resolve the matters in favor of the employees, thus allowing
those employees to continue working in their chosen profession.
States that have a presumption against enforcement, such as Penn-
sylvania, generally have articulated the pro-employee rule that non-compete
agreements are not valid in termination cases.  In Insulation Corporation of
America v. Brobston,191 the Court stated that when an employee is termi-
nated because he is not performing in a manner that promotes the em-
ployer’s business interests (in other words, “for cause”), the employer
“deems [that] employee worthless.”192  Brobston, the employee, was termi-
nated by Insulation Corporation of America (“ICA”) for poor perform-
ance.193  Shortly thereafter, he found employment with an ICA competi-
tor.194  The Brobston Court found that because ICA concluded that Brob-
ston was not a valuable employee and his worth to the corporation was
presumably insignificant, the need to protect itself from Brobston’s compe-
tition had diminished.195  In other words, when an employee is of so little
value to the employer that continued employment does not benefit the em-
ployer’s business interests, the employee can no longer be a threat to the
employer’s livelihood.  Thus, the employer no longer has a legitimate busi-
ness interest in enforcing a non-compete agreement.196 Brobston suggests
that a non-compete clause is presumptively invalid when an employer ter-
minates the employee for cause.197  In Wrigg, the Court dealt with this issue
only in the abstract.  It stated that as an employer, JCCS was in the best
position to prevent competition from Wrigg.198  Thus, because JCCS
elected to terminate the employee relationship, it could not enforce the
Agreement under those circumstances.199  The Wrigg Court should have
taken its decision one step further, synthesized the rules articulated in Cali-
190. See e.g. Econ. Grocery Stores Corp. v. McMenamy, 195 N.E. 747, 749 (Mass. 1935); Sec.
Servs., Inc. v. Priest, 507 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Kroeger v. Stop & Shop Cos., Inc.,
432 N.E.2d 566, 572 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (tying the inequity analysis to the means of discharge).
191. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729.
192. Id. at 735.
193. Id. at 731–732.
194. Id. at 732.
195. Id. at 735.
196. Id.
197. Although Brobston suggests that a non-compete clause is presumptively invalid when an em-
ployee is terminated for cause, the Court was clear that non-compete cases are to be determined on a
case-by-case basis. Brobston, 667 A.2d at 735.  The Pennsylvania Court does not apply a strict rule to
cases involving post-employment restrictive covenants, even when the employee is terminated. Id. at
733–734.
198. Wrigg, 265 P.3d at 653.
199. Id. at 654.
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fornia, New York, and Pennsylvania, and concluded that when termination
is involuntary, there is a rebuttable presumption that non-compete agree-
ments are invalid regardless of the circumstances of the employee’s depar-
ture.  Unfortunately, the Court did not make a decisive connection between
controlling the employment relationship, for-cause termination, and pre-
cluding the enforcement of a non-compete agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
While this author agrees with the Wrigg Court’s ultimate decision, the
Court’s overall discussion was lacking on three points.  First, before deter-
mining whether an agreement has the requirements of an enforceable non-
compete clause, the Court should have addressed the contract issues in-
volved in Wrigg.  In particular, the Court should have addressed the ques-
tion of consideration and the potential ambiguity surrounding the terms of
the shareholder agreement.  If the agreement is an unenforceable contract,
enforceability of the non-compete clause becomes irrelevant.  Next, even if
a contract is enforceable, a non-compete clause within it is not automati-
cally enforceable.  As a general rule, post-employment, non-competes are
allowed if they fall within certain parameters, one of which is the reasona-
bleness of the clause.  Although an inexact science, such a determination
usually depends upon the use of a balancing test.  As part of that balance,
courts should consider the evolving psychological contract.  The modern
employer-employee relationship is based on an unspoken promise by the
employer to ensure the employee is competitive in the job market, and
courts should examine whether it makes sense to enforce a non-compete
agreement under such circumstances.  This is especially true in Montana,
where an employer can impede the employee’s strong statutory protections
against wrongful discharge by asking her to sign a term employment agree-
ment—effectively turning her into a quasi at-will employee.  Finally, the
Court’s unclear position regarding how “for-cause termination” may affect
the enforceability of non-compete agreements provides little guidance to
district courts on how they should decide future cases.  As such, it is likely
that some trial courts will see Wrigg as a per se prohibition against non-
compete agreements when the employee is involuntarily terminated; while
other courts may interpret Wrigg in such a way that allows them to look to
the circumstances of termination prior to determining the enforceability of
the non-compete agreements.  In failing to adequately address this critical
issue, the Wrigg Court has invited inconsistent application among Mon-
tana’s district courts and an inevitable revisiting of the issue for a more
definitive clarification.
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